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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellant Cheryl Bonenberger brought this sexual 
harassment suit against her former employer, Plymouth 
Township, located in Pennsylvania; the Plymouth Township 
Police Department; and against Sergeant La Penta, a police 
department employee. She has asserted claims under both 
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. S 1983. This appeal requires us to 
decide whether a police officer acts under "color of state 
law" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 when he sexually 
harasses a co-employee whose work shift he supervises, 
even if he is not her official supervisor and lacks authority 
to hire or fire her. We must also apply our precedent in 
Title VII sexual harassment cases, reaffirming the 
established distinction between quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment claims. For the reasons set forth below, 
we will reverse in part and affirm in part the district court's 





Bonenberger worked as a dispatcher for the Plymouth 
Township Police Department from about February 1993 to 
April 11, 1994. She alleges that during her employment, 
Sergeant Joseph La Penta regularly accosted her at work 
with obscene remarks and unwelcome sexual advances. 
She also claims that La Penta frequently fondled her 
breasts or pinched her buttocks while she attempted to 
complete work assignments. She contends that this ongoing 
harassment occurred in the presence of police employees 
and that management-level personnel became aware of La 
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Penta's conduct in January 1994, but for nearly three 
months did nothing to curtail it. Bonenberger adds that 
although she consistently rejected La Penta's advances, the 
harassment persisted, driving her to resign her position as 
dispatcher on April 11, 1994. 
 
The parties agree that although La Penta did not hire 
Bonenberger and was not her official supervisor, he 
supervised all of the dispatchers, including Bonenberger, 
when no higher-ranking officer was on duty. At such times 
he had sole control over Bonenberger's work environment, 
determining when she and the other dispatchers might take 
a break and which tasks they would perform. Bonenberger 
testified that on one such occasion, he grabbed her 
buttocks in the presence of three other law enforcement 
officials. The police department's own independent 
investigation confirms that this incident occurred. 
 
The district court granted defendants summary judgment 
on Bonenberger's claims that (1) La Penta, individually and 
in his official capacity, deprived her of the right to equal 
protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment; (2) Plymouth Township Police 
Department's failure properly to control, discipline and 
train La Penta violated section 1983 and (3) Plymouth 
Township Police Department contravened Title VII by 
permitting La Penta's quid pro quo and hostile work 
environment sexual harassment. The district court also 
dismissed Bonenberger's state law claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and battery against La 
Penta, and her claim against the police department under 
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
S 951 et seq. (1991), declining to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367.1 
Reviewing the record de novo, we will reverse the district 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3) permits a district court to "decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a [state law] claim . . . if [it] has 
dismissed 
all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .. . ." Moreover, where 
federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court "must 
decline 
to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial 
economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative 
justification for doing so." Borough of West Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 
780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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court's order of summary judgment on Bonenberger's 
section 1983 claim against La Penta and on her Title VII 
hostile work environment claim against the police 
department. We will affirm the order of summary judgment 
with respect to her section 1983 claim and her claim of 






We address first Appellant's section 1983 claim against 
Sergeant La Penta.2 A finding of liability under 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983 "requires that the defendant . . . have exercised 
power `possessed by virtue of state law and made possible 
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of 
state law.' " West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). See also 
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
The district court correctly concluded that state action is 
a threshold issue in any section 1983 case. It erred, 
however, in holding that La Penta's harassment could not 
meet the color of law requirement solely because he "had 
no authority to hire, fire or make any employment decision 
regarding Bonenberger . . . ." Bonenberger v. Plymouth 
Township, No. Civ. A. 96-403, 1996 WL 729034, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 18, 1996). A state employee may, under certain 
circumstances, wield considerable control over a 
subordinate whose work he regularly supervises, even if he 
does not hire, fire, or issue regular evaluations of her work. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, 
 
       Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, 
       custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
       Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
       United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the 
       deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
       Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
       action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress 
       . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1996). 
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See Poulsen v. City of North Tonawanda, 811 F. Supp. 884, 
895 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (factual dispute about the defendant's 
actual authority precludes summary judgment on section 
1983 sexual harassment claim where plaintiff alleged that 
defendant possessed unwritten authority to influence her 
work evaluations and assignments). There is simply no 
plausible justification for distinguishing between abuse of 
state authority by one who holds the formal title of 
supervisor, on the one hand, and abuse of state authority 
by one who bears no such title but whose regular duties 
nonetheless include a virtually identical supervisory role, 
on the other.3 
 
In so holding, we do not suggest that all acts of an on- 
duty state employee are state action for purposes of section 
1983. Although "state employment is generally sufficient to 
render the defendant a state actor," West, 487 U.S. at 50 
(citation omitted), not all torts committed by state 
employees constitute state action, even if committed while 
on duty. For instance, a state employee who pursues purely 
private motives and whose interaction with the victim is 
unconnected with his execution of official duties does not 
act under color of law. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 
1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A]n otherwise private tort is 
not committed under color of law simply because the 
tortfeasor is an employee of the state."). In contrast, off- 
duty police officers who flash a badge or otherwise purport 
to exercise official authority generally act under color of 
law. Rivera v. La Porte, 896 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(finding state action existed because offender identified 
himself as peace officer, arrested plaintiff and used police 
car). Thus, the essence of section 1983's color of law 
requirement is that the alleged offender, in committing the 




3. It appears that Sergeant La Penta and Sergeant Carbo, Bonenberger's 
official supervisor, performed exactly the same role when they were in 
charge of the dispatchers' shifts. The only appreciable difference between 
their authority over Bonenberger was that Carbo, not La Penta, was 
responsible for submitting written evaluations of her work. While this 
distinction is significant, it does not justify the district court's 
conclusion 
that La Penta exercised no professional authority over Bonenberger. 
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In holding that Sergeant La Penta's conduct was not 
under color of law, the trial court relied heavily on 
Woodward v. Worland, 977 F.2d 1392 (10th Cir. 1992) and 
a district court decision, Rouse v. City of Milwaukee, 921 F. 
Supp. 583 (E.D. Wis. 1996). See Bonenberger, 1996 WL 
729034, at *3 & n.2. These cases are inapposite. The 
Woodward court determined that the defendant police 
officers lacked authority over the plaintiffs, three 
dispatchers, only because the dispatchers worked for a 
private company rather than the police department itself. 
The Woodward court expressly "did not . .. decide whether 
an outside third party or co-employee could ever be liable 
for sexual harassment under [section] 1983 and the Equal 
Protection Clause." Woodward, 977 F.2d at 1401. Moreover, 
the same court of appeals that decided Woodward later 
noted that "in some instances co-employees may exercise 
de facto control over sexual harassment victims such that 
they act under color of law." David v. City of Denver, 101 
F.3d 1344, 1354 (10th Cir. 1996) (section 1983 sexual 
harassment claim may not be dismissed for failure to state 
claim upon which relief may be granted merely because the 
defendants are non-supervisory co-workers). 
 
We likewise find the district court decision in Rouse v. 
City of Milwaukee, 921 F. Supp. 583, 588 (E.D. Wis. 1996), 
to be inapplicable to the facts of this case. The Rouse 
plaintiffs and the police officer they sued for harassment 
"held the same rank and [the harasser] had no authority to 
give them orders." Id. The plaintiffs in Rouse therefore could 
offer no evidence that the perpetrator acted under color of 
law when he harassed them on the job. Instead, they 
alleged only that the accused officer, whose official rank 
was the same as theirs, had seniority and was generally 
well-connected in the department. Id. Unlike La Penta, the 
defendant in Rouse did not supervise the plaintiffs' work, 
and his seniority afforded him no authority over his 
colleagues' assignments. 
 
In fact, the circumstances in Rouse stand in stark 
contrast to Sergeant La Penta's direct power to give 
Bonenberger orders when supervising her work shift. It is 
undisputed that La Penta could alter her workload 
whenever he supervised her shift. Indeed, as the 
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department's counsel conceded at oral argument, if 
Bonenberger failed to follow his orders, the police 
department would view that failure as insubordination for 
which La Penta properly could begin a disciplinary process 
that might result in her discharge. Under these 
circumstances La Penta's role within the departmental 
structure afforded him sufficient authority over 
Bonenberger to satisfy the color of law requirement of 
section 1983. C.f. David, 101 F.3d at 1354 (absent some 
type of state authority on the part of the defendant, "it is 
difficult to establish that the abusive action was 
perpetrated `under color of state law' rather than as an 
essentially private act of sexual harassment.") (citations 
omitted). If a state entity places an official in the position of 
supervising a lesser-ranking employee and empowers him 
or her to give orders which the subordinate may not 
disobey without fear of formal reprisal, that official wields 
sufficient authority to satisfy the color of law requirement of 
42 U.S.C. S 1983. 
 
To conclude otherwise would be to create a perverse 
incentive for government employers to avoid labeling 
workers as supervisors, so as to insulate themselves from 
section 1983 liability. Clearly, an employer should not be 
permitted to evade so easily the statutory protections 
against discrimination. We, therefore, look to substance 
rather than form in determining whether an individual 
defendant possesses supervisory authority. In doing so 
here, and for the reasons discussed above, we will reverse 





Bonenberger also alleges a section 1983 violation by 
Plymouth Township Police Department.4 The district court 
properly concluded that Bonenberger's allegations do not 
create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the 
township's failure to train, discipline or control La Penta 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. As in past cases, we treat the municipality and its police department 
as a single entity for purposes of section 1983 liability. See, e.g., 
Colburn 
v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 671 n.7 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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violated 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 would impose 
liability for La Penta's inadequate training and discipline 
only if the Plymouth Police Department was deliberately 
indifferent to the rights of persons with whom he came in 
contact. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 
388 (1989) (holding that inadequate police training cannot 
give rise to mere respondeat superior liability). Deliberate 
indifference exists if the challenged act implements a 
municipal policy, i.e., a "statement, ordinance, regulation, 
or decision officially adopted and promulgated by[a local 
governing] body's officers." Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 
947 F.2d 1042, 1059 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
Section 1983 liability may also exist if the allegedly 
unconstitutional action reflects "practices of state officials 
. . . so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 
`custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. (citation 
omitted). 
 
As a result, deficient training may form a basis for 
municipal liability under section 1983 only if " `both 
(1) contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or 
knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents, and 
(2) circumstances under which the supervisor's inaction 
could be found to have communicated a message of 
approval to the offending subordinate' " are present. 
Freedman v. City of Allentown, 853 F.2d 1111, 1117 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 
F.2d 663, 673 (3d Cir. 1988)). Bonenberger has alleged no 
specific inaction by La Penta's supervisors that could be 
interpreted as encouraging his actions. To the contrary, it 
is undisputed that the police department had a policy 
against sexual harassment and that La Penta's regular 
training included education intended to prevent such 
behavior. Therefore, we will affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment on Bonenberger's section 1983 




We now turn to Bonenberger's allegation under Title VII, 
in which she claims that she was subjected to hostile work 
environment harassment by the Plymouth Township Police 
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Department. To make out a prima facie case of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff 
must prove 
 
       (1) the employee suffered intentional discriminati on 
       because of [his or her] sex; (2) the discrim ination was 
       pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination 
       detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the 
       discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable 
       person of the same sex in that position; and (5)  the 
       existence of respondeat superior liability. 
 
Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d 
Cir. 1990). We conclude that the district court erroneously 
granted summary judgment in favor of the department on 
Bonenberger's hostile work environment claim. Specifically, 
we hold that the court erred in finding that Bonenberger 
failed to satisfy the respondeat superior element of the 
prima facie test. See Bonenberger, 1996 WL 729034, at *8. 
 
Respondeat superior liability exists in connection with a 
hostile environment sexual harassment claim if either: (1) 
the tort is committed within the scope of employment (i.e., 
the harasser has actual authority over the victim, by virtue 
of his job description); (2) the employer was negligent or 
reckless in failing to train, discipline, fire or take remedial 
action upon notice of harassment; or (3) the offender relied 
upon apparent authority or was aided in commission of the 
tort by the agency relationship. See Bouton v. BMW of North 
America, Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus if the 
employer knew or should have known of the harassment 
and failed to take prompt remedial action, it is liable under 
Title VII. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1486. 
 
In this case, the police department had a sexual 
harassment policy in place during the entire period that 
she worked there, and Bonenberger knew of the policy, yet 
she did not file a formal report until shortly before leaving 
the department. La Penta's supervisor, Captain Pettine, 
testified that he learned of the harassment only five days 
before Bonenberger quit, when it was reported by a 
sergeant. He immediately questioned Bonenberger. Upon 
learning that La Penta was the alleged aggressor, Pettine 
informed Chief Cross and questioned La Penta about the 
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reported incidents. Bonenberger left the department a few 
days later, claiming that she could no longer endure La 
Penta's treatment. The department nonetheless continued 
its investigation and despite inconclusive findings, issued 
Sergeant La Penta a letter of reprimand. On the basis of 
this evidence, the district court found no factual dispute 
with respect to Bonenberger's hostile work environment 
claim because "[d]efendants promptly and adequately 
responded to Bonenberger's allegations of sexual 
harassment." Bonenberger, 1996 WL 729034, at *9. 
 
The township's remedial actions insulate it from Title VII 
liability only if they were "reasonably calculated to prevent 
further harassment." Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 
412 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). While the response 
detailed above suggests that the department pursued 
appropriate remedial action, the district court disregarded 
evidence suggesting that "management-level employees had 
actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a 
sexually hostile environment and failed to take prompt and 
adequate remedial action" in violation of Title VII. Andrews, 
895 F.2d 1486. Specifically, Bonenberger testified that her 
official supervisor, Sergeant Carbo, knew about and 
acquiesced in La Penta's harassment. She stated that in 
mid-January 1994, La Penta pinched her buttocks in front 
of a group of officers, and that "all of the officers were 
laughing, including Sergeant James Carbo" who was 
"standing next to Sergeant La Penta when the incident 
occurred."5 She also maintains that on April 1, 1994, La 
Penta approached her from behind while she was speaking 
to Sergeant Carbo and slid his hand across her chest. 
According to Ms. Bonenberger, although she told La Penta 
to stop, Carbo merely smiled and did not indicate in any 
way that he disapproved of La Penta's actions. 
 
Bonenberger also alleges that other management-level 
officials knew she was being harassed almost two months 
before she resigned and chose not to discipline La Penta or 
otherwise curtail the harassment.6 She testified, and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Reproduced Record, Volume I, at 184. 
 
6. Bonenberger resigned from her position as dispatcher on April 11, 
1994. The incident when La Penta grabbed her buttocks in front of three 
other police officers allegedly occurred on February 13, 1994. 
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township's investigation confirmed, that on February 13, 
1994, Sergeant La Penta grabbed her buttocks in the 
presence of Sergeant Galetti, Officer Obenski, and Officer 
McBride. The record shows that a few weeks after the 
incident witnessed by Sergeant Galetti, the police 
department distributed a new version of its sexual 
harassment policy, which differed from the original policy 
only in its inclusion of a statement that the policy also 
applied to dispatchers. Bonenberger claims that this is 
evidence that the department had become aware of La 
Penta's actions and, as a result, amended and redistributed 
its policy on harassment. Certainly, one might reasonably 
question whether an employer's simple reissuance of an 
existing sexual harassment policy is an appropriate 
remedial action, particularly when the employer knows both 
that harassment is occurring and the name of the 
employees involved.7 The discrepancy between 
Bonenberger's version of the facts and that urged by La 
Penta, Plymouth Township and Plymouth Police 
Department, presents an issue of material fact that should 
be resolved at trial. 
 
The police department also argues that its written sexual 
harassment policy insulates it from Title VII liability for 
hostile environment sexual harassment. But this would be 
true only if that policy contained an effective grievance 
procedure. See Bouton, 29 F.3d at 110 ("[A]n effective 
grievance procedure -- one that is known to the victim and 
that timely stops the harassment -- shields the employer 
from Title VII liability for a hostile work environment."). In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Since, under the police department's own policy, Sergeants Galetti and 
Carbo were responsible for investigating complaints of sexual 
harassment, see note 9, supra, their failure to take prompt and 
appropriate remedial action, if proven at trial, gives rise to 
departmental 
liability. See Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 1997)(Title 
VII 
liability for hostile environment harassment arises when "information 
[about sexual harassment] either (1) come[s] to the attention of someone 
who (a) has under the terms of his employment, or (b) is reasonably 
believed to have, or (c) is reasonably charged by law with having, a duty 
to pass on the information to someone within the company who has the 
power to do something about it; or (2) come[s] to the attention of such a 
someone."). 
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this case, it is clear that the department's harassment 
policy did not specify a grievance procedure.8 Since, as 
previously noted, there exists a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to whether the department's remedial efforts were 




Bonenberger also alleges that she suffered quid pro quo 
sexual harassment. We recently held that "[u]nwelcome 
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute 
[quid pro quo] sexual harassment when (1) submission to 
such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term 
or condition of an individual's employment [or] (2) 
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual 
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual . . . ." Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 
F.3d 1286, 1296 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
S 1604.11(a)(1) and (a)(2)). 
 
Bonenberger maintains that two sets of facts alleged in 
her complaint satisfy this definition. First, La Penta told her 
that she had taken too many sick days, adding "you better 
-- if you really like this job and you want to stay here, you 
better start straightening out and conforming to the rules." 
Bonenberger attempts to characterize this as a veiled threat 
to have her fired for rejecting his sexual advances. Second, 
she claims La Penta's behavior effectively conditioned her 
continued employment upon her willingness to endure a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The department's policy is a two-page statement divided into four 
sections. The first section, entitled "Purpose," is a paragraph generally 
emphasizing that "the Plymouth Township Police Department will not 
tolerate sexual harassment of any type." Plymouth Township Police 
Department, General Order D-137, dated March 1, 1994, at 1. The 
second section, "Policy" adopts the EEOC's definition of sexual 
harassment, directs employees to refrain from engaging in such 
harassment, states that complaints must be investigated, and indicates 
that those who violate the policy will be disciplined. The third section 
defines the terms "employee" and "sexual harassment," and offers 
examples of offending conduct. The final section, "Distribution," 
indicates that a copy of the policy should be given to all personnel. 
 
                                12 
 
 
sexually-charged hostile work environment. Neither of these 
theories alleges a claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
 
Although Bonenberger claims that she viewed La Penta's 
warning about sick leave as a threat that La Penta would 
seek to have her fired, she conceded at her deposition that 
even when the statement was made, she knew La Penta 
lacked power to terminate her employment. Title VII quid 
quo pro sexual harassment generally requires that the 
harasser have authority to carry out the quid pro quo offer 
or threat. See Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 
568 F.2d 1044, 1048-49 (3d Cir. 1977) (quid pro quo sexual 
harassment occurred when supervisor responsible for 
evaluating plaintiff 's work stated during promotion 
discussion that he expected her to have sexual relations 
with him); Craig v. Y & Y Snacks, 721 F.2d 77, 80 (3d Cir. 
1983) (plaintiff 's dismissal for refusing sexual advances of 
supervisor with plenary authority over employment 
decisions was quid pro quo harassment). In this case, it is 
undisputed that La Penta could not fire Bonenberger, even 
assuming he actually threatened to do so. 
 
More importantly, Title VII liability exists only if"the 
consequences attached to an employee's response to the 
sexual advances [are] sufficiently severe to alter the 
employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment." Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1296-97. La Penta's 
statement that abusing the department's sick leave policy 
could cause her dismissal in no way changed the terms and 
conditions of Bonenberger's employment, because she had 
always been subject to dismissal for improperly failing to 
report for work. Further, La Penta did not suggest, either by 
word or action, that sexual favors were the price for keeping 
her job. Therefore, we hold that the district court properly 
concluded that no quid pro quo threat existed on this 
record. 
 
Bonenberger also presents a novel argument that 
constructive discharge due to a hostile work environment 
may provide the "quid" in a claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment under Title VII. She argues that in her case, La 
Penta's actions effectively made enduring his harassment a 
condition of keeping her job. This reasoning confuses the 
elements of quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
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harassment. Sex discrimination results in constructive 
discharge if "the conduct complained of would have the 
foreseeable result that working conditions would be so 
unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable person in the 
employee's shoes would resign." Goss v. Exxon Office 
Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885, 887-88 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Although Bonenberger has alleged facts sufficient to survive 
summary judgment on her claim of constructive discharge 
due to a hostile work environment, this alone is not enough 
to make out a claim for quid pro quo harassment. In this 
case, there is no quo for the alleged quid of enduring the 
hostile work environment. As noted above, quid pro quo 
harassment requires a direct conditioning of job benefits 
upon an employee's submitting to sexual blackmail, or the 
consideration of sexual criteria in work evaluations. In the 
absence of evidence that the employer intended to force the 
plaintiff 's resignation, constructive discharge cannot form 
the basis for quid pro quo sexual harassment.9 While the 
line between quid pro quo and hostile work environment 
harassment is not always clear and the elements present in 
one case sometimes may give rise to both types of claims, 
such is not the case here. We therefore reject Bonenberger's 
hybrid legal theory and affirm the district court's order 
granting summary judgment with respect to her claim of 
quid pro quo harassment. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 
order granting summary judgment with respect to 
Bonenberger's Title VII claim of quid pro quo sexual 
harassment and her section 1983 claim against Plymouth 
Township. With regard to all other claims, we will vacate 
the district court's order granting summary judgment and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We do not decide whether constructive discharge, combined with 
evidence that the employer sought to force a resignation, can ever 
constitute quid pro quo sexual harassment. Since no such evidence has 
been presented in this case, we defer resolution of this question for 
another day. 
 
10. We also reject Bonenberger's argument that the district court erred 
in permitting Appellees additional time in which to amend their 
summary judgment motion. Under the circumstances, this decision was 
well within the district court's discretion. 
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On remand, the district court is directed to reinstate 
plaintiffs' state law claims. 
 
A True Copy: 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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